The Specificity of Penal Law and the Limits of Its Autonomy

A Descriptive Comparative Study

Abstract

This study examines the autonomy (self-sufficiency) of penal law through a descriptive, analytical, and comparative approach between Omani and Jordanian legislation. It addresses the central problem of whether criminal law is independent from, or subordinate to, other branches of law, despite its close interconnection with them. The first section explores the philosophical autonomy of criminal law, covering the philosophy and justifications of punishment, the principle of criminal legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege), and the philosophy of criminalization and punishment. The second section examines the manifestations of the independence of criminal law, represented in the autonomy of legal terminology and concepts — such as the terms ‘public official’, ‘human being’, and ‘property’ — as well as the independence of evidentiary rules and the rules governing criminal responsibility and punishment. The study finds that the prevailing juristic opinion affirms the autonomy of criminal law without implying its complete separation from other branches of law, and that this autonomy rests primarily on the principle of criminal legality. The study recommends that penal policies on criminalization and punishment remain consistent with the spirit of the law, that the preservation of individual liberty remain the general rule, and that the rule ‘what cannot be proven under civil law cannot be proven under criminal law’ be applied to prevent the misuse of criminal law’s autonomy to circumvent the strict evidentiary requirements of civil law.